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 45 
Abstract 46 
Background 47 
The 2013-15 Ebola epidemic in West Africa was the largest so far recorded, and 48 
mainly affected three adjacent countries, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The 49 
worst affected country (in terms of confirmed cases) was Sierra Leone.  The present 50 
paper looks at the epidemic in Sierra Leone. The epidemic in this country was a 51 
concatenation of local outbreaks.  These local outbreaks are not well characterized 52 
through analysis using standard numerical techniques.  In part, this reflects 53 
difficulties in record collection at the height of the epidemic.  This paper offers a 54 
different approach, based on application of field-based techniques of social 55 
investigation that provide a richer understanding of the epidemic.  56 
 57 
Methods 58 
In a post-epidemic study (2016-18) of two districts (Bo and Moyamba) we use 59 
ethnographic data to reconstruct local infection pathways from evidence provided by 60 
affected communities, cross-referenced to records of the epidemic retained by the 61 
National Ebola Response Commission, now lodged in the Ebola Museum and 62 
Archive at Njala University.  Our study documents and discusses local social and 63 
contextual factors largely missing from previously published studies.   64 
 65 
Results 66 
Our major finding is that the epidemic in Sierra Leone was a series of local 67 
outbreaks, some of which were better contained than others.  In those that were not 68 
well contained, a number of contingent factors helps explain loss of control.  Several 69 
numerical studies have drawn attention to the importance of local heterogeneities in 70 
the Sierra Leone Ebola epidemic.  Our qualitative study throws specific light on a 71 
number of elements that explain these heterogeneities: the role of externalities, 72 
health system deficiencies, cultural considerations and local coping capacities. 73 
 74 
Conclusions 75 
Social issues and local contingencies explain the spread of Ebola in Sierra Leone 76 
and are key to understanding heterogeneities in epidemiological data.  Integrating 77 
ethnographic research into epidemic-response is critical to properly understand the 78 
patterns of spread and the opportunities to intervene. This conclusion has significant 79 
implications for future interdisciplinary research and interpretation of standard 80 
numerical data, and consequently for control of epidemic outbreaks. 81 
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Introduction  93 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a viral hemorrhagic fever largely spread through contact with 94 
body fluids of an infected person.  From its first identification from an outbreak close to the 95 
Ebola river in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1970s there have been over 20 96 
outbreaks, mainly in isolated communities in the central African forest belt.  In 2013 there 97 
was an outbreak in south-eastern Guinea, at the western extremity of the humid forested 98 
region in West Africa.  Infection rapidly spread to the neighboring countries of Liberia and 99 
Sierra Leone, largely through inter-personal contact.  Carers – whether medical personnel or 100 
family members – are especially vulnerable to infection, through nursing the sick or 101 
preparing bodies for burial.  The disease became established in urban centers, and cases 102 
spread to Europe and North America.  A major international effort was mounted to contain 103 
the West African outbreak.  By the end of 2015 this effort was largely successful, though the 104 
virus has resurfaced since in two parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  To date, 105 
however, the West African outbreak remains the largest on record with 28 616 confirmed, 106 
probable and suspected cases and 11 310 deaths by June 2016 [1].  107 
 108 
As the first large-scale regional outbreak the West African episode has attracted 109 
considerable analytic attention.  There is recognition that lessons needed to be learned 110 
relevant to other potential large-scale episodes, such as the one that occurred in North Kivu 111 
(DRC) [2].  Some of the key epidemiological literature on the West African outbreak deploys 112 
what we will here term the standard numerical approach (for example [1], [3] and [4]).  This 113 
makes considerable use of multivariate statistical methods and models.  Applied to the West 114 
African epidemic of EVD these methods lead to the identification of numerous local-level 115 
heterogeneities.  Numerical methods are only as reliable as the data on which they feed and 116 
collecting reliable data in the heat of an emergency response to an Ebola epidemic is far 117 
from straightforward.  Whether heterogeneities apparent in numerical data arise from 118 
problems of data collection or complexities on the ground is unclear.  Our own work, based 119 
on fieldwork in two districts in Sierra Leone, the worst affected country in terms of confirmed 120 
cases of Ebola, is intended to address this interpretive challenge.  Our research strategy 121 
seeks to reconstruct local infection chains through evidence provided by communities, using 122 
ethnographic and micro-geographical data gathering techniques.  Ebola spread from person 123 
to person, meaning that it has an inherently social dimension.  This social dimension, we will 124 
argue, is key, to understanding heterogeneities in the epidemiological data.  Our aim, 125 
therefore, is to understand the spread of Ebola in two largely rural districts of central Sierra 126 
Leone by assessing the social dynamics of infection and the implications of this for control of 127 
epidemic outbreaks in many other settings. 128 
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 129 
Limitations of previous numerical studies  130 
We examined papers using the standard numerical approach to explore data from standard 131 
reporting forms and laboratory records ([1], [3], [4], [5], [6]). These papers exhibit awareness 132 
of possible defects in the data set, and exercise care in reaching conclusions.  Garske et al. 133 
[1] remark that “unfortunately, no information on the mechanisms by which individual cases 134 
enter the database was recorded, and it is therefore not possible to assess the impact this 135 
has on [case fatality] estimates” (p. 7).  After applying editing rules such as the elimination of 136 
incomplete records, they reach a conclusion that heterogeneities are real and not just 137 
artefacts of noisy data. A picture is presented of Ebola in West Africa not as a single 138 
epidemic but as a concatenation of local and at times dissimilar events.  We will provide 139 
further (qualitative) evidence for supposing that this conclusion is sound. 140 
 141 
The cited papers establish between them a number of broad, descriptive findings about 142 
Ebola on an epidemic scale – for example, that risks of cross-infection ran in households 143 
and peaked during the final course of the disease and subsequent burials, that the disease 144 
affected men and women equally, and that infants and the elderly were especially 145 
vulnerable.  But on questions with especial significance to protection, such as whether 146 
infection was due to local nursing and burial customs or more prosaic practices such as 147 
cleaning beds and corpses, or whether the susceptibility of the very young and the elderly 148 
was by reason of age, rather than because of body contact between infected mother and 149 
child or the exercise of the special responsibilities of the elderly to the sick and dying, the 150 
numerical data do not speak. 151 
 152 
It would be good to know whether local disputes, variations in ritual practices, or bad luck 153 
modified infection risks. This ambition is clearly articulated in the paper by Fang et al. [3]. 154 
They surmise that “the difference in incidence rates among ethnic groups might be due to 155 
their geographic locations, economic development, social behaviors, or religious traditions” 156 
and propose that “further investigations are needed to elucidate this issue” (p. 4492). 157 
 158 
Our own paper takes this call as its starting point.  Adopting an anthropological approach, 159 
we visited a majority of nodes in the main infection chains identified by eye-witnesses and 160 
survivors in two districts, Bo and Moyamba.  We then traced with these informants how the 161 
various infection chains unfolded.  We identified chiefdoms and villages that had suffered 162 
contrasting outbreaks (large, small, quickly contained, long-lasting outbreaks) and for each 163 
we identified the probable index cases then sought to trace the stories of how the infection 164 
spread from these cases to infect others. This information was then cross-checked with the 165 
 5 
Njala data base records, and with a document kept by a nurse-volunteer at the Moyamba 166 
Ebola holding center, that records in careful detail the admission of patients and their test 167 
results in the first phase of the epidemic.  This proved helpful in confirming statements made 168 
by eyewitnesses but not covered in the national Ebola data base. The result of linking 169 
quantitative and quantitative information was a richer account of local heterogeneities in 170 
infection patterns and response that provides the basis for a wider understanding of the 171 
issues that explain heterogeneities in epidemics.  172 
 173 
Methods 174 
The findings reported in this paper are part of a larger study (Ebola Gbalo – Ebola Trouble) 175 
analyzing different levels of response – community, district, national and international – to 176 
the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone 2014-15, and the interactions between these various levels 177 
[2]. An aim of this larger project was to assess national and local capacities for response to 178 
the epidemic, and to place these elements, often masked by the more highly visible 179 
international efforts, into a broader collaborative context. Data were collected principally by 180 
the second and third authors at various time during 2016 and 2017. Data on the infection 181 
chain in Niawa Lenga chiefdom were collected in 2018 by a team of three people led by the 182 
first author (see acknowledgements). 183 
 184 
To understand epidemic responses, we first needed a more detailed picture of how infection 185 
chains were initiated and sustained, and how they were ended more rapidly in some cases 186 
than in others.  The purpose of the work described in this paper was to establish what 187 
combinations of local factors determined the heterogenous responses to Ebola already 188 
determined to have occurred via application of the standard numerical approach.  We used 189 
ethnographic techniques to elucidate the behavioral factors behind the numbers. 190 
 191 
Ethics approval was received from the ethics review boards of the London School of 192 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Approval Reference Number 12016) and Njala University 193 
(Institutional Review Board 2016). 194 
 195 
Sample strategy and ethnographic fieldwork approach   196 
While not possible to apply an ethnographic approach on a national scale, even in a small 197 
country like Sierra Leone, it is nevertheless important to examine how local infection chains 198 
were concatenated.  How did infection chains start off, and die down, and how were 199 
adjacent chains related? This suggested a geographically focused case study might be 200 
better than a spread of randomly chosen snapshots from different parts of the country.   201 
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 202 
A further criterion was to choose a time period after the initial stages (when the epidemic 203 
was concentrated in the east of the country), but before the international response was fully 204 
ramped up, so that the functioning of local agency would be more readily visible.  These 205 
criteria led to the selection of two adjacent districts – Bo and Moyamba – in the southern part 206 
of the country.   207 
 208 
The propensity for EVD to move along main roads in Sierra Leone, emphasized in previous 209 
studies ([3], [7], [8]), provided the basis for our sampling strategy.  We followed infection 210 
chains down the main roads crossing Bo and Moyamba Districts in the direction of 211 
Freetown, while also taking careful account of side branches connecting interior villages, 212 
where infection was blocked or rapidly terminated due to the propensity of rural communities 213 
to go into “lock down” mode when threatened by dangers. We describe key interconnected 214 
infection chains from both districts.  215 
 216 
Members of our research team are based at Njala University, an institution with campuses at 217 
Mokonde in Kori Chiefdom, in Moyamba District, and in Bo.  Our group had earlier 218 
undertaken fieldwork in Ebola affected communities for the Ebola Response Anthropology 219 
Platform (www.ebola-anthropology.net.) in 2014-15, and so knew key localities where 220 
enquiries were needed.  We began with the earliest cases and traced connections from 221 
these known nodes.  A number of villages were identified for further investigation.  We 222 
checked these choices against the numbers of confirmed Ebola cases per chiefdom, and 223 
then by village, in the national Ebola data base, a copy of which is archived in Njala, and as 224 
a result added some places to the sample of communities where enquiries were required.   225 
 226 
Local authorities were then notified. Community-level informed consent for our enquiries was 227 
obtained in meetings held to explain the project attended by local chiefs and elders.  Key 228 
informants were then identified (e.g. survivors, or members of affected families).  Potential 229 
interviewees were asked for their individual informed consent.  Village-level informants were 230 
sometimes keen to supply information, either because they felt the story of their suffering 231 
should be heard, or because their motives had been misunderstood.  These informants often 232 
were willing to give their views in informal focus group settings.  Other informants were 233 
willing to speak only anonymously and in private.  Both kinds of interview were conducted in 234 
the Mende language, mainly by a single interviewer.  Mende is a strongly oral culture where 235 
words are counted and remembered.  Recording devices were used in village-level 236 
interviews sparingly or not at all.  Notes were written-up as soon as possible after the 237 
interview.   238 
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Stories told were complex and multi-faceted.  Several visits were made to key sites of 240 
enquiry, to cross-check material and hear other views.  We also followed up events by 241 
interviewing responders.  The Ministry of Health was notified about our study, and medical 242 
personnel generally granted requests for interviews.  We were not able to get the agreement 243 
of security personnel deployed in quarantine operations at district level. In the accounts that 244 
follow we link events described to numerical data base sources where appropriate. 245 
 246 
Numerical data records 247 
Numerical data relating to the West African epidemic of EVD derive from two main sources – 248 
admission data collected via (WHO standard) Ebola Case Investigation Forms, completed 249 
when a person suspected of having Ebola presented to a care or holding facility, and 250 
laboratory records of tests for Ebola applied to blood or swab samples. 251 
 252 
The version of the standard case investigation form used in Sierra Leone had three pages. 253 
The first two pages are filled in on first contact or admission.  There are sections for names, 254 
gender, address, occupation, location where the patient became ill, date on which they 255 
became sick, and symptoms and hospitalization. A second page covers contact with Ebola 256 
patients, including attendance at funerals, and outcomes (hospitalization and death). The 257 
third page provides formats for recording the results of laboratory tests. 258 
 259 
Eye-witness reports confirm that medical personnel coping with the arrival of a patient with 260 
Ebola symptoms had limited opportunity to fill in or check the numerous details.  Some 261 
patients were too distressed to supply necessary information and questions will often have 262 
been answered by family members or helpers, not always accurately, either because details 263 
were not known, or because information was deliberately concealed to avoid incrimination.  264 
Participation in funerals was declared illegal under Ebola emergency regulations and carried 265 
the risk of a fine or imprisonment. 266 
 267 
That record keeping was often inconsistent can be illustrated by the case of Bo, the largest 268 
town in provincial Sierra Leone. Ebola cases arrived in Bo from Kenema in the early days of 269 
the epidemic. A rather large urban outbreak followed, eventually necessitating the opening 270 
of a dedicated Ebola Treatment Unit at the outlying village of Bandajuma. The records for 271 
Ebola victims in the Bo outbreak were supposed to indicate the district, chiefdom and 272 
settlement of origin. Bo town is the headquarters of Bo District and also of Kakua Chiefdom, 273 
one of Sierra Leone’s 149 chiefdoms (the lowest level of government administration).  The 274 
 8 
data base lists 181 laboratory-confirmed cases for Kakua chiefdom. Eight cases were 275 
wrongly assigned and came from other chiefdoms. Of the remaining 173 cases only 36 276 
(38%) can be unambiguously assigned to Bo town from information in the data base.  In 58 277 
other cases (62%) a location in Bo town can be inferred only from the name of the street.  278 
Seemingly, there were 94 confirmed cases of EVD in Bo town, but this cannot be known 279 
except from fieldwork on the ground, with a street map in hand.     280 
 281 
One further source needs to be explained, since it is not available elsewhere.  This is a 282 
hand-written log of admissions, test results and outcomes maintained (apparently as a 283 
personal initiative) by a nurse at the Ebola Holding Centre (EHC) outside Moyamba town.  284 
The Moyamba EHC was hastily improvised facility arranged in an empty (school?) building 285 
with few affordances operating from July 2014.  It handled many of the early cases of EVD in 286 
Moyamba District, until internationally staffed and supported Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) 287 
were opened in Bo and Kenema in October 2014, at which point some Ebola+ cases were 288 
referred to the new ETUs.  The EHC in Moyamba was replaced (in December 2014) by a 289 
better-equipped ETU staffed by international (Norwegian) volunteers, to which all remaining 290 
cases were transferred. A photocopy of the admissions log of the EHC from June to 291 
November 2014 was made available to us after interviewing its compiler and proved useful 292 
in confirming details regarding dates and outcomes of cases referred to in village interviews. 293 
An anonymized version is included in the online supporting materials. 294 
 295 
Limitations of this study 296 
Any study such as this depends on the accuracy of informants’ memories and their 297 
willingness to be frank.  Events described were triangulated from accounts provided by 298 
independent witnesses, and discrepancies followed up and resolved.  These witnesses were 299 
identified by the second author.  They were independent in the sense that they were 300 
members of the community in question but did not belong to the immediate household of the 301 
infected person. In several communities we were also able to make use of base-line data 302 
collected by focus group and questionnaire interview for the Ebola Response Anthropology 303 
Platform during the epidemic in 2014 (publicly available online at www.ebola-304 
anthropology.net). Again, inconsistencies were followed up and resolved. An inherent 305 
limitation of the approach is that it cannot infer larger regional trends.  If the standard 306 
numerical approach had found evidence of larger regional trends this would have cast doubt 307 
on the utility of ethnographic analysis to understand heterogeneity through case study 308 
approaches like ours. Instead, however, numerical research to date has reported local 309 
heterogeneity, justifying the disaggregated case-following approach adopted here. 310 
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Furthermore, we identify categories of elements that explain heterogeneity in this context, 311 
which are likely to have wider relevance in other contexts and can be tested in other 312 
settings.        313 
 314 
Results: local Infection chains analysis 315 
Analyzed from the perspective of the standard numerical approach the various episodes 316 
making up the 2014-15 Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone appear highly heterogenous. This 317 
heterogeneity can be seen in figures for outbreaks by locality (Table 1).   318 
 319 
Western Urban (Freetown) and Western Rural (Freetown’s peri-urban periphery), together 320 
accounting for about 30 per cent of the national population, had 41 per cent of all Ebola 321 
cases.  Provincial Sierra Leone is divided into three provinces, 12 districts and 149 322 
chiefdoms (the lowest level of local government), and contained 59 per cent of cases, but 323 
these were unevenly distributed.  According to the national data base, and including only 324 
laboratory confirmed entries, 39 chiefdoms (26%) had no cases at all. Of 110 chiefdoms with 325 
cases (74%) as few as 14 chiefdoms accounted for 60% of all chiefdom-level cases (5014 326 
cases).   327 
 328 
Moyamba District infection chains: families begin to keep 329 
their distance 330 
Village 1A is a typical medium-sized off-road farming settlement on the left bank of the Taia 331 
river, in Kori chiefdom, Moyamba District.  It is joined to the main Bo-Freetown highway by a 332 
7 km track from the right bank of the river.  The river must first be crossed by canoe.  The 333 
track is motorable only in the dry season but can be used by motorcycle taxis (okada) at all 334 
times of the year.  The people are Mende-speakers, but they live along the provincial 335 
boundary with Northern Sierra Leone and are intermarried with Temne-speaking families 336 
from the other side of the river.  The Taia river floods in August and canoe traffic ceases for 337 
a period.  The settlement is in effect cut off in the middle of the rains. 338 
 339 
Ebola came to Village 1A as a spill-over from the Kenema outbreak.  The virus crossed the 340 
border from Guinea in early 2014, and an outbreak in Kailahun District resulted in an Ebola 341 
case being brought to the Government Hospital in Kenema, where there was an isolation 342 
ward for victims of Lassa Fever.  Ebola has even more exacting biosafety requirements than 343 
Lassa Fever, and the nursing staff in Kenema were not prepared to deal with Ebola in 344 
advance.   345 
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 346 
The WHO case definition of Ebola at that stage emphasized bleeding as a key sign.  Few 347 
Ebola patients in Sierra Leone showed signs of bleeding, and cases were misdiagnosed as 348 
malaria or Lassa Fever. In addition, the authorities were slow to react to laboratory 349 
information that there was an outbreak of EVD in Sierra Leone and supplies of chlorine and 350 
personal protective equipment in the hospital were inadequate.   351 
 352 
Kenema Government Hospital became the site of a major outbreak of nosocomial infection 353 
in June-July 2014.  EVD appears to have come to Village1A via a diamond miner (AA) 354 
working in Lower Bambara chiefdom, not far from Kenema.  One of his sons (BB) fell sick 355 
and was taken to Kenema hospital, where he died.  It is not known whether he was already 356 
sick with Ebola or became infected in the hospital.   357 
 358 
His death was treated as Ebola and AA was denied sight of the son’s body.  The stunned 359 
father was taken ill at the hospital gates.  His family had no wish to let him follow his son into 360 
Kenema hospital, perceived as the source of Ebola infection.  They conceived a plan to seek 361 
medical treatment from a sister, who was a renowned herbalist in Village 1A in Moyamba 362 
District. AA was familiar with the village since it was his mother’s place of birth and he 363 
himself came from a village nearby. 364 
 365 
The government had tried to block the further spread of EVD by reinforcing the check point 366 
at the western entrance to Kenema, forcing passengers to submit to medical inspection 367 
intended to detect anyone with elevated temperature.  Local transporters, however, are 368 
familiar with a number of by-pass routes opened during the war.  One of them was tasked to 369 
evade the checks and deliver AA – described as profusely sweating - to a settlement in Kori 370 
chiefdom on the main road to Freetown, where a bike taxi was chartered to take the sick 371 
man – held fast as a pillion on the back of the bike by one of his sons - to the canoe crossing 372 
to Village 1A.  There, too weak to climb up to the village, he was carried up the cliff path by a 373 
strong young volunteer, who confirmed details of AA’s arrival in an interview in 2016.  The 374 
date was reported as 9th July 2014, six weeks after the government had first announced the 375 
presence of the disease in the country. 376 
 377 
People interviewed in village 1A were doubtful whether AA had arrived with Ebola.  378 
Normally, the progression is a 3-day period of headaches and fever followed by a 3-day 379 
“wet” period in which vomiting, diarrhoea and bleeding occur, before death or eventual 380 
recovery.  Unusually, AA survived for two weeks after his arrival as a sick man, alternately 381 
sleeping in a family hut and in the mosque, while his sister treated him with various leaf 382 
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infusions, before he eventually succumbed, and was buried just outside the village.  He was 383 
not observed to be showing reported signs and symptoms of Ebola. 384 
 385 
AA’s sister (CC) then sickened.  By mid-July the country was on high alert for Ebola cases.  386 
News of the sick woman had reached the Community Health Officer (CHO), head of the 387 
Ministry of Health team in Kori chiefdom, based in Taiama, and he arrived with a team on 388 
the right bank of the Taia river opposite the village, seeking a blood sample from the sick 389 
woman.  The CHO phoned across to the chief (DD) explaining that he wanted to send two of 390 
his team across the river to collect the blood.  The chief responded that this would not be 391 
possible as he had had no notification about the visitation, either from the Paramount Chief 392 
or the Ministry of Health.  393 
 394 
The chief later explained, in interview, that he knew sick people were sometimes given 395 
blood, but he had never heard of blood being taken from the sick, especially on the point of 396 
death. Lack of explanation about blood testing, and the arrival of responders in full PPE, 397 
convinced some in the village that this mysterious new disease was a cover for a kind of 398 
medical “vampirism” (bona hinda).  399 
 400 
The CHO was forced to withdraw but came back with his team and authorization the next 401 
day.  DD required that the CHO cross the river to do the blood sampling in person. The 402 
sample was taken for testing, and proved positive, but the woman died before any follow up 403 
was made.   404 
 405 
As a sowei (an elder of the women’s Sande society) CC’s burial attracted a group of her 406 
peers from surrounding villages.  The burial was conducted according to the secret rites of 407 
the society.  This was before the Ebola burial rules had been promulgated (August 8th 2014) 408 
and the CHO later explained in an interview that he did not have any means to prevent the 409 
funeral.  Interviewees in Village 1A claimed that no further infections occurred among the 410 
group of women conducting the burial rites.   411 
 412 
There were, however, further cases of Ebola both in Village 1A, and in Village 1B, a small 413 
settlement on the left bank of the Taia, about 3 km to the south, and at least two of the 414 
corpses were swabbed on burial. In all, village people report that there were 22 deaths 415 
subsequent to the case of CC in Village 1A (14 female, 8 males) and nine deaths in Village 416 
1B (7 females, 2 males, with six persons coming from one family related to the family of CC 417 
in Village 1A). Several of the people infected in Village 1B had visited CC to express 418 
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sympathy with her, and later to take part in her funeral.  These visits are an inescapable 419 
social obligation in tightly intermarried rural communities.  420 
 421 
The evidence that these deaths were Ebola cases is not conclusive but is supported by the 422 
Moyamba records. We were able to cross-reference five persons who were admitted to the 423 
facility on 24 September 2014 bearing the same family name as several of the persons who 424 
died in Village 1B.  They are listed as coming from Taiama, the chiefdom HQ for Kori 425 
chiefdom; villages IA and IB are inaccessible places, and Taiama is the nearest settlement 426 
of any size. Of this group of five patients, two were diagnosed as positive for Ebola, two died 427 
without diagnosis, and one (an old man) was negative, and later interviewed for this study.   428 
 429 
A youth organizer in Taiama (EE) reported that he had helped to arrange the transport of 430 
two suspected Ebola cases from the right bank of the Taia opposite Village 1B.  Even if an 431 
Ebola ambulance had been available it would not have been able to travel along the track to 432 
the riverbank in rainy season conditions, so a commercial motorbike rider had been hired 433 
instead.  Motorbikes crossed the difficult places on single track bridges improvised by the 434 
commercial riders.  The incident was vivid in his mind, because the rescue team arranging to 435 
collect one of the patients had only a single PPE suit, and the bike rider and the pillion 436 
passenger needed to support the patient were both nervous of becoming infected. A 437 
nervous rider on a difficulty rainy season track was more likely to have a spill, with serious 438 
consequences for the patient and everyone else in the team, so the decision to dress the 439 
patient in the PPE, rather than decide which of the two – rider or supporter – should wear 440 
the protective suit, made sense.  EE told the story self-deprecatingly, remarking ‘how little 441 
we knew about the disease at the time’.  In fact, it suggests that everyone engaged in 442 
extracting high-risk patients was beginning to understand about the significance of body 443 
contact in spreading the disease. 444 
 445 
An elderly man interviewed in Village 1B (FF) told us he had been admitted to the Moyamba 446 
holding centre along with two other persons from his village, both of whom he knew had 447 
tested positive for Ebola and subsequently died. FF was tested Ebola negative and had 448 
come back to the village to give notice of the fate of the two persons with whom he had been 449 
admitted.  Clearly, some of the deaths were confirmed as EVD through laboratory evidence.  450 
But still villagers have doubts about whether all admissions had Ebola on entry, or were 451 
cross-infected after arrival, due to the notoriously poor conditions at the Moyamba facility. 452 
 453 
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Quarantine was imposed in Village 1A when a small detachment of five police and army 454 
personnel arrived on 18th August 2014 and stayed for a month.  The recently enacted 455 
national emergency regulations authorized military intervention in epidemic response.  If the 456 
admission of a group of patients “from Taiama” to Moyamba EHC on 24th September 2014 457 
corroborates our interviewee’s recollection in Village 1B then infections must still have been 458 
occurring in Villages 1A and 1B in the second half of September. So why the security forces 459 
were withdrawn about that time is unclear.  The national data base records dates for onset 460 
of symptoms for patients with positive blood tests in Kori chiefdom from 2nd July to 24th 461 
November 2014, with two outliers in January and February 2015.  One person from Village 462 
1A and five from Village 1B are listed with positive blood samples.   463 
 464 
What is clear from interviews is that local perceptions were changing very quickly.  There 465 
was now a distinct awareness the disease was spread by body contact.  The name for EVD 466 
given in Village 1A was bondawote (literally “family turn away”), glossed by an informant as 467 
meaning “you are completely abandoned to die”.  Another interviewee said that “people ran 468 
to their farms, [and] most of those who got sick recover[ed] when they stopped touching 469 
each other”.  Youth leaders in a village at the end of a river-bank track leading to Villages 1A 470 
and 1B feared that sick relatives in the two afflicted villages would seek help from the health 471 
post in their village.  They went out and cut down the stick bridge crossing a rainy season 472 
flooded ravine, making further contact impossible.  This rendered apparent in dramatic terms 473 
the rapidly acquired notion that “touching” was deadly. It is likely that this local “turning 474 
away” was a significant factor in ending local infection chains. 475 
 476 
Spread of infection to a local market center 477 
Village 1C is a small settlement on the main Bo-Freetown highway in Kori chiefdom at the 478 
point where the c. 10 km track branches leading to the right bank of the Taia river opposite 479 
Village 1A and 1B.  This was where AA the sick man from Kenema, transferred from a taxi to 480 
a motorbike on his journey to reach his relative, the herbalist, in Village 1A.  AA was uncle to 481 
GG, a woman living in Village 1C, who joined the CHO’s the team on the trip to collect the 482 
blood sample in Village 1A.  It is reported that she went to Village 1A to warn her relatives 483 
there about the dangers from Ebola. How she became infected is not clear.  She tested 484 
positive for EVD in Taiama and died there on 12th September 2014.  Her sick husband 485 
sought treatment from a pharmacist based at road junction market (Village 1D) on the 486 
highway to Freetown (Fakuniya chiefdom).  The pharmacist also sickened and died, 487 
presumably from Ebola, but without test data to confirm it.  The man was a member of a 488 
Catholic sodality [closed association] and his funeral attracted sympathizers from as far as 489 
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Freetown and Bo.  This was followed by a substantial outbreak of EVD in Village 1D, with 490 
spread of cases up and down the Freetown and Moyamba roads, perhaps reflecting local 491 
networking among traders.  The first 12 patients testing positive for Ebola from Village 1D 492 
were admitted to Moyamba EHC on 17th September.  In all, 36 patients admitted to 493 
Moyamba EHC from Village 1D tested positive for Ebola.  Village 1D was quarantined by the 494 
security forces. The last E+ case admitted to Moyamba EHC is recorded on 8th November 495 
2014. The national data base shows 64 E+ cases from Village 1D, and 11 from adjacent 496 
villages (some in Kori chiefdom).  The dates for onset of symptoms of the first and last cases 497 
in Fakuniya chiefdom are 9th September 2014 and 4th November 2014.   498 
 499 
Bo District infection chains: good response marred by 500 
accidents 501 
Village 2A is a village about one km. south of the Kenema-to-Bo highway, some 20 km. east 502 
of Bo city. It is a centre of Islamic instruction.  A noted teacher (kamoh) from a village on the 503 
border of Bo and Kenema districts was offering instruction in Village 2A, and then fell sick.  504 
Enquiries in his home village suggested he had been in the habit of going to Kenema for 505 
treatment for some longer-term medical complaint.  It can be surmised he became infected 506 
with Ebola as a result of the outbreak in Kenema town.   507 
 508 
The kamoh died in Village 2A on 13th August and was buried according to Islamic practice.  509 
This requires thorough washing of the corpse.  The implications of the brand-new Ebola 510 
national regulations had yet to be realized in the village, even if they were known. Some of 511 
his pupils are said to have used water from the washing of their learned master’s body in the 512 
hope of inheriting some of his wisdom and charisma.   513 
 514 
The kamoh had been seen by medical personnel in a near-by health centre but he had been 515 
discharged without any diagnosis of Ebola or instructions about what to do if is condition 516 
worsened.  Soon after the burial his pregnant wife (HH) began to complain of joint pains and 517 
fever. She turned for help to the mother-and-baby unit in near-by Village 2B.  The midwife in 518 
charge examined her and offered some treatment for the fever.  She had already received a 519 
briefing about Ebola risks, and used gloves in her examination.  But HH’s symptoms were as 520 
yet no different from malaria, so she was discharged and sent home with appropriate 521 
medicine for her presumed condition.  522 
 523 
Two days later HH died, after giving birth to a still-born child.  Her other two children 524 
sickened and died two days later.  The woman’s death was reported to the Paramount Chief 525 
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for Kakua chiefdom, based in Bo, and the medical authorities immediately intervened.  526 
Eleven more people fell sick in rapid succession.  Samples were taken and inter-village 527 
movements were stopped.  The villagers were told that even the nurses who had treated HH 528 
would now have to be quarantined for 21 days, and that burials could only be undertaken by 529 
a specially equipped burial team.  530 
A brother of the kamoh died and his body was not buried for 3 days, something that was 531 
especially shocking to the villager’s Islamic religious sensitivities. The hazard suits of the 532 
burial team alarmed villagers, as did the unexpected arrival of police, military and the District 533 
Medical Officer.   534 
By now a further 13 people had become seriously ill and were taken to Bo Government 535 
hospital.  There were no preparations to deal with Ebola cases, and the sick villagers were 536 
placed in a kind of holding shed.  There was no infection of hospital staff or patients, but the 537 
episode was disturbing to community members.  538 
One remarked that “to my dismay no treatment was given but [they were] just cluster[ed] into 539 
a non-caring room, where five of them immediately died”.  They were told that there was no 540 
bed for admission at the hospital.  The district Ebola task force then decided that the sick 541 
villagers should be brought back to the village, to be quarantined in the community school. 542 
The quarantine was strict.  The security forces prevented any movement, even for the 543 
essentials of daily life.  Families suffered heartbreak as they heard their loved ones crying 544 
out for water and were prevented from helping.  Nor was there any satisfactory arrangement 545 
to feed the patients. Villagers feared the security forces had been ordered to poison them. 546 
The situation was improved when the local parliamentarian arranged for the delivery of beds, 547 
and (after 12 days) “9 bags of rice were given to the community with the population of 210, 548 
including children”. The district Ebola task force helped to mobilize supplies, even though at 549 
this stage it lacked a budget and remained reliant on voluntary contributions. 550 
New cases were still occurring, and the death toll continued to rise.  Villagers formed three 551 
burial teams, so that they could bury their own loved ones promptly, and the authorities 552 
seem to have concurred in this.  Thirteen victims were taken to holding centers in Kenema 553 
and Kailahun, and only one person is said to have survived.   554 
The total number of laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola in Village 2A appears, from the 555 
national records, to have been 43 (over 20 per cent of the total village population, and 28 per 556 
cent of our corrected number for all laboratory-confirmed Ebola cases in Kakua chiefdom, 557 
including Bo city).  The villagers reported in interviews that there were 37 deaths.  This 558 
implies either that only six people survived or that the national data base under-estimates 559 
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the total number of infections in Village 2A.  In fact, the names of seven certificated survivors 560 
were reported during our enquiries, suggesting the discrepancy may not be large.  561 
The strict quarantine was not wholly effective.  There was at least one escape, when a 562 
young man (II) broke bounds to visit a larger settlement, T, a small town about 12 km. south 563 
of Bo. II then showed symptoms of EVD. Whether he was infected in Village 2A or on his 564 
arrival in T is unclear.   565 
T is close to Bo city where cases are first recorded in the national data base from mid-June.  566 
The national data base records 29 laboratory-confirmed cases in T over the period 23rd July 567 
to 13th December.  The outbreak here is probably connected to infection in Bo.  We have no 568 
date for the quarantine breach in Village 2A but it is unlikely to have been earlier than 569 
September since quarantine was imposed from the second half of August.  570 
T was a bridge to a somewhat larger outbreak in the adjacent chiefdom, Bumpeh Ngao, 571 
where 48 laboratory-confirmed cases are reported in the national data base. The Bumpeh 572 
outbreak occurred at a later stage in the epidemic, when communities and responders were 573 
better prepared.  The infection chain ran from 3rd October 2014 to 10th January 2015, a 574 
period of 100 days.  The Community Health Officer thought that most cases had some 575 
connection with a large funeral for a “big person” (Mende: numu wa) in T.   576 
At Village 2C in Bumpeh Ngao chiefdom there is a long-established and well-respected 577 
mission hospital.  The hospital authorities approached the local community and explained 578 
that the hospital (which lacked a ward capable of handling Ebola cases, until international 579 
responders built one) would have to close if cases arrived.   580 
It was agreed with the chiefdom authorities that in order to keep the hospital open during the 581 
Ebola outbreak all potential patients would pass through a screening and triage process 582 
located outside the hospital.  Any potential patients showing signs and symptoms of Ebola 583 
would be conveyed to newly opened Ebola case-handling facilities in Bo and Kenema, 584 
where they would receive specialist treatment. Chiefs and sub-chiefs were responsible for 585 
conveying a message about why these measures were necessary and the message was 586 
widely understood.   587 
Not all families agreed with the implications, however.  JJ, the female chief of a satellite 588 
settlement (Village 2D), attended the “big person’s” funeral in Village T, where she appears 589 
to have contracted Ebola.  The nurse in charge of the village health center suspected the 590 
true cause of her illness and informed the authorities, but JJ’s family objected.  591 
Nevertheless, an ambulance was called, and she was taken to the case-handling facility at 592 
Bandajuma, where she died.  Disagreement over responsibility for JJ’s fate led to a 593 
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breakdown in relations between the family and the nurse so severe that she had to be 594 
transferred to another district. 595 
JJ was not alone in trying to hide her symptoms.  Interviews with medical personnel in 596 
Village 2C and an adjacent community health post elicited several other stories about the 597 
lengths to which other patients went to hide symptoms to avoid being transferred to an Ebola 598 
case-handling facility.  As yet, there were few survivors from such centers, which were 599 
suspected of being “death camps”.   600 
Informants reported that international advisers wondered why Bumpeh Ngao chiefdom was 601 
“difficult”.  The fear of being wrongly diagnosed as an Ebola case and cross-infected in a 602 
holding or treatment facility grew as stories about Kenema hospital and poor conditions at 603 
the holding centre in Moyamba spread. Local doubts over diagnosis were reinforced by a 604 
case in which a blood sample sent by the hospital in Village 2C to a laboratory in Kenema 605 
had come back wrongly categorized as negative because it had been confused with a 606 
sample from a village with the same name in Kenema District.  607 
Null infection chains: A dog that didn’t bark?  608 
Thirty-nine chiefdoms had no cases of Ebola; many were protected from spread of infection 609 
by distance or poor roads.  Four chiefdoms, however, were situated on or close to the main 610 
national road transport network, surrounded by chiefdoms with cases.  One of these is 611 
Kamajei chiefdom in Moyamba district. Led by their Paramount Chief community activists in 612 
Kamajei closed tracks and closely monitored movements of strangers.  Interviews and 613 
surveys undertaken in this chiefdom during the epidemic (fieldwork in December 2014, 614 
www.ebola-anthropology.net) showed widespread acceptance that Ebola was spread by 615 
body contact, and not through consumption of bush meat as people had earlier been 616 
informed.      617 
 618 
It is also relevant is to ask about communities where cases occurred, but where infection 619 
chains were closed down promptly.  One such chiefdom is Niawa Lenga in Bo District. This 620 
was one of four chiefdoms (in Bo and Moyamba Districts) in which an Ebola infection chain 621 
lasted for less than 50 days.  The other three chiefdoms in this group (Bagbo, Bagruwa and 622 
Jaiama Bongor) had few confirmed cases, but Niawa Lenga had a substantial number (19).   623 
 624 
In general, chiefdoms in Bo and Moyamba districts were among the quickest in the country 625 
to end infection chains, with an average per chiefdom of 90 days for Bo district, and 95 days 626 
for Moyamba, compared to figures for chiefdoms in the first and last districts to experience 627 
the outbreak – Kailahun and Port Loko - with an average of 133 and 280 days respectively.   628 
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 629 
Why was the outbreak in Niawa Lenga ended promptly?  The answer appears to be that by 630 
mid-October 2014 the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Ebola control of the Bo 631 
District Ebola Response team were fully implemented and working successfully, and that 632 
there was little or no prior opposition to and distrust of local authorities, a factor in a case 633 
described in detail by Parker et al. [9].  Lessons from Village 2A had been well-learnt.  634 
 635 
Fieldwork revealed two distinct infection chains.  One involved the chiefdom headquarters, 636 
Village 3A, and the other a village, Village 3B which is close to the motor road from Bo to 637 
Yele.  Vehicles to Village 3A take the motor road, and branch right just after the town of 638 
Dambara. There is a shorter route – a track leading to Village 3A from the northern outskirts 639 
of Bo.   640 
 641 
A middle-aged female resident of Bo (KK) was heading along this track, possibly seeking 642 
local treatment in Village 3C for a long-standing complaint.  Village 3C is located on the 643 
boundary between Kakua and Niawa Lenga chiefdoms.  Here, KK was taken ill with what 644 
turned out to be EVD.  Her helpers decided to hire some youths to carry her in a hammock 645 
to her family.  The hammock party left for Village 3A before dawn, without informing the town 646 
authorities, a breach of local protocol suggesting they had something to hide.  647 
 648 
Discharging her hammock carriers at the entrance to Village 3A, and being too weak to walk, 649 
KK sent for family helpers to bring her to her house, where she died a day or two later.  650 
Others in the home were infected, including a child who had slept on KK’s bed.  The 651 
woman’s death was promptly reported to the district response team and the death was 652 
confirmed as Ebola; SOPs were promptly activated. 653 
 654 
The community was quarantined – a process supervised by a doctor from the international 655 
response.  At first security forces kept out all visitors, including relief workers, but villagers 656 
complained to the foreign doctor and food and other necessities were quickly supplied.   657 
 658 
Niawa Lenga is a chiefdom of small-scale rice farmers, and October is the harvest period, 659 
when daily life centers around the rice farm.  Some people doubtless slipped away down 660 
unregulated bush tracks and made themselves quietly absent in their farms, while others 661 
collected daily necessities from the relief agencies.  The demand by the chiefdom authorities 662 
for adherence to Ebola byelaws was respected, and no disputes were reported.  Infection in 663 
Village 3A ceased. 664 
 665 
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Infection in village 3B appears not to be connected with the outbreak in Village 3A. The 666 
origins of this second outbreak lie in Bo Government Hospital. A nurse contracted Ebola 667 
(apparently outside the hospital) and patients on her ward took flight.  One of the patients, 668 
LL, headed home to Village 3B. A cluster of cases subsequently occurred in Village 3B, and 669 
control measures were rapidly implemented by the Bo-based District Ebola Response team, 670 
which included establishing quarantine barriers. With a local politician’s help quarantined 671 
homes were supplied, enabling people to stay put.   672 
 673 
There was one hiccup. At one of the burials the “safe burial” team attended without a 674 
stretcher and improvised with sticks from a farm. The farmer collecting these sticks after the 675 
burial became another victim of the outbreak.   676 
 677 
The village location records show 12 cases in Niawa Lenga chiefdom, 4 in Village 3A and 8 678 
in Village 3B.  The records of laboratory confirmed cases show 19 cases in Niawa Lenga 679 
between 17th October and 21st November 2014.  Villagers in Village 3B insist there were 680 
more, with 11 deaths in their village alone. Nevertheless, excepting for the mistake over the 681 
stretcher, control measures worked as intended. The first confirmed case was recorded on 682 
17th October 2014 and the last on 21st November. The outbreak in the chiefdom was 683 
controlled within 36 days.  684 
 685 
Discussion  686 
The results reported here help confirm a picture of the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone as a 687 
concatenation of smaller outbreaks.  The heterogeneity of the epidemic thus needs to be 688 
explained in terms of local behavioral circumstances and, most especially, social 689 
circumstances, for which a standardized top-down numerical analysis or externally driven 690 
emergency-response is not necessarily the most effective [11]. This was certainly true for 691 
our two study districts, which were affected early in the epidemic and had to cope before a 692 
national or international response had been fully mobilized.  693 
 694 
The local name for Ebola (in the Mende language of the south and east of Sierra Leone) is 695 
bondawote – “family turn around”.  This recognizes an essential truth about Ebola infection; 696 
it is a disease of social intimacy, with close family members bearing the highest risks of 697 
further infection [7].  The risks of infection peak in the final “wet” phase of the disease and 698 
immediately after death, when the corpse is prepared by family members for interment.     699 
 700 
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The disease also makes inter-community jumps [8], but our ethnographic data reveal that 701 
these jumps are often the result of family networking.  Control, or loss of control, over 702 
infection thus depended a great deal on cooperation of families, and in particular on whether 703 
family care givers were persuaded to collaborate in reducing risks of contact with a sick 704 
person or infected body.   705 
 706 
The disease came under control only when the family “turned around”.  The heterogeneities 707 
of Ebola infection dynamics reflect whether families turned quickly or not, and whether this 708 
“turning” was willing or achieved only under pressure.  Four different groups of explanatory 709 
elements can be discerned in the data presented. As overarching themes emerging from our 710 
detailed analysis, they help explain local heterogeneity in ways that need to be considered 711 
for other localized outbreaks (either in other parts of Sierra Leone, or in other countries and 712 
other epidemics).   713 
 714 
1. Heterogeneities caused by externalities. 715 
Whether an epidemic chain was controlled or not sometimes depended on externalities – 716 
events over which there was little or no control.  A good instance of this would be the 717 
isolated location of Village 1A, and the seasonal flood of the Taia river, which inhibited 718 
initial response and delayed diagnosis.   719 
 720 
Diagnostic accidents – the mix up of blood samples from two different villages with the 721 
same name – also help explain why some outbreaks were larger than might have been 722 
expected from the current state of knowledge or preparedness on the part of responders.  723 
The surge in cases in Bumpeh Ngao, quite late in the epidemic’s trajectory, when 724 
response modalities were better developed, is a case in point. Misdiagnosis created a 725 
false confidence among family carers that a diagnosis of Ebola was unlikely. 726 
 727 
Panic over nosocomial infection might also be considered a kind of accident, connected 728 
to the totally unexpected outbreak of a disease never before seen in the region. The 729 
spread of Ebola to patients in the isolation ward at Kenema Hospital, and the notoriously 730 
poor conditions in the makeshift Ebola Holding Centre in Moyamba, then led to a sudden 731 
and widespread collapse of confidence in medical treatment.  Some people became 732 
convinced that Ebola was spread deliberately by medical workers, others that Ebola 733 
case handling was connected to theft of body parts and blood.  Families strategized 734 
desperately to prevent patients being consigned to Ebola handling facilities. 735 
 736 
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Much of the Ebola response was a race against time to put in place proper procedures, 737 
in which improvisation was often required.  Allocating the single PPE suit to the patient, 738 
rather than to rider and pillion helper when extracting patients from Village 1B, might be 739 
seen as an inspired solution.  The burial team’s lack of a stretcher – did they forget to 740 
pack it in their haste? - in Village 3B was a mistake with which a village farmer paid with 741 
his life.  742 
 743 
2. Heterogeneities resulting from structural or health system 744 
deficiencies  745 
Families often struggled to bring sick patients for diagnosis, and many helpers were at 746 
risk of infection during that process.  In some instances, little could be done to improve 747 
access to services (Villages 1A and 1B, for example).  Later in the epidemic, better 748 
transport equipment (dedicated Ebola ambulances with trained crew, for example), 749 
improved communication (notably, a telephone helpline), and more rapid, mobile 750 
laboratory diagnosis certainly improved capacity to reach and transfer patients over a 751 
large part of the country.   752 
 753 
The availability of Ebola case handling capacity, and the degree to which communities 754 
trusted or shunned those facilities [12], varied locally, and negative impacts are clearly 755 
seen in our data.  A study of the Kenema Ebola Treatment Unit (open from October 756 
2014) reports that it only gained wider acceptance after the first survivors returned to 757 
their families [13].  The facility at Bandajuma (Bo) also opened in October 2014, and its 758 
presence and impact are glimpsed only in our later case studies.  The Ebola Holding 759 
Centre in Moyamba town was opened as early as June 2014 and left its (negative) mark 760 
across the district. It was eventually replaced by a Norwegian-staffed and funded ETU in 761 
Moyamba in December 2014, too late for the infection chains reported above. 762 
 763 
The case-study material relating to Villages 1A and 1B, and 2A illustrate the 764 
disadvantages of not yet having in place a clear set of Ebola response SOPs, and a 765 
proper relief system supply chain to support quarantine.  The benefits of having such 766 
organizational procedures are apparent in the speed with which the later Niawa Lenga 767 
outbreak was contained. 768 
 769 
The original case definition for Ebola imported from central Africa over-emphasized 770 
bleeding as a sign and symptom. The case definition was later changed in line with 771 
actual experience, but families varied in the extent to which they took account of this 772 
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earlier misinformation.  Arguments about symptoms emerged where precipitate action in 773 
treating a potential case as Ebola was resisted (we documented this in Village 3C, for 774 
example). 775 
 776 
Other examples of poor messaging, inappropriate in the local context, exist. For 777 
example, bush meat, especially eating of monkeys, was widely warned against over 778 
radio and on posters as a cause of infection.  Villagers who never ate bush meat (often 779 
for religious reasons) imagined themselves to be safe from infection. It was only late in 780 
the epidemic that this message was replaced by an emphasis on limiting body contact 781 
with persons of unknown Ebola status.  Village communities varied in the extent to which 782 
they worked out for themselves whether or not bush meat or body contact were risks 783 
(www.ebola-anthropology.net.).  784 
 785 
3. Heterogeneities linked to cultural considerations. 786 
Older family members are often heavily involved in caring for and treating the sick and 787 
advising on steps to be taken in case of serious sickness and death.  This explains the 788 
quantitative finding that older people were disproportionately at risk of infection from 789 
EVD.  There was then a knock-on effect – older people in positions of family leadership 790 
are more likely to be senior members of the major male and female sodalities.  The 791 
elaborate funeral rituals of the sodalities played a significant part in local multiplication of 792 
infection (e.g. Villages 1A, and 2A). 793 
 794 
It is not the size of the funeral that determines the infection risk, but the distribution of 795 
duties in preparing and taking leave of the corpse [7].  These are matters known only to 796 
members of the sodalities. The pattern of subsequent infections might then depend on 797 
where the key elders came from across a chiefdom or chiefdom section.  The 798 
conversation between communities and responders about control of infection risks from 799 
funerals improved only when sodality members with information on Ebola infection 800 
control talked to sodality elders, who then turned this information into safer practical 801 
outcomes ([7], [9]). 802 
 803 
Local government in rural Sierra Leone is dualistic.  Chiefdom law is separate from 804 
national law.  National government intervenes locally only with the collaboration of 805 
chiefdom administrations.  A slip-up over sending notifications to the local chief through 806 
the correct channels hindered the process of establishing that there was EVD in Village 807 
1A, and this delayed implementation of infection control.   808 
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 809 
Belief in the efficacy of traditional herbal medicine is high in rural areas of Sierra Leone, 810 
and this trust was intensified by experience of hospital-based nosocomial infection.  811 
Traditional practitioners vary in reputation. A renowned practitioner will draw clients from 812 
far and wide. The likelihood of a practitioner being infected by a patient is greater where 813 
the catchment is wide. Ebola first spread across the border from Guinea through the 814 
patients of a well-known herbalist. The index case in Village 1A was also a renowned 815 
herbalist.  Villages without noted practitioners were less likely to experience infection.  816 
The government banned traditional medical practice for the duration of the epidemic.  817 
Arguably, a better approach might have been to find a role for herbalists in the epidemic, 818 
perhaps as community interlocutors, to explain the infection risk. 819 
 820 
4. Heterogeneities as a result of variations in coping options  821 
Once communities realized that Ebola infection risks were linked to contact with infected 822 
persons, they began to develop ideas for limiting social contacts, especially with 823 
strangers.  One approach was to impose self-isolation by controlling entrance to and exit 824 
from the community, building on experience with civil-defence during the civil war (1991-825 
2002).  Another approach (again widely practiced during the war) was to retreat into 826 
sokoihun (“corners”).  Typically, this would mean the household withdrawing to the hut in 827 
the family rice farm, where there was both food and shelter.  These solutions were less 828 
easily applied in some places than others.  The greater the dependence on trade rather 829 
than the farm for subsistence livelihood the less practical it was to practice self-isolation. 830 
 831 
Community members in Village 1A explicitly mentioned the self-isolation option, more or 832 
less reinforced by the cutting of the footpath bridge linking them to Village 1C.  833 
Informants connected living in “corners” with cutting down on bodily contact.  Village 2A, 834 
however, was more dependent on its external links, as a center for both trade and 835 
Koranic education, and had no option but to accept externally enforced quarantine, and 836 
to apply for relief assistance.  More generally it seems clear that the greater difficulty in 837 
ending infection chains in districts closer to Freetown (notably Port Loko and Western 838 
Rural) relates to the greater involvement of these districts in trade and transportation. 839 
 840 
 841 
 842 
 843 
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Conclusion 844 
The overall conclusion is that the epidemic of Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone 2014-15 845 
is best viewed from a disaggregated perspective, as a series of local, but linked episodes, 846 
shaped by a diverse series of factors including bad luck and miscalculation, as well as 847 
variation in local cultural imperatives, response strategies and configurations of local 848 
livelihood opportunities.  Despite local specificity, we have identified four groups of factors 849 
that help explain this heterogeneity which are likely to have relevance for other settings. It is 850 
critical that epidemic-response rapidly captures the presence of such heterogeneity. To do 851 
this implies the continuing need for an ethnographically informed epidemiology: 852 
ethnographic research is critical for developing a richer picture of epidemic spread and a 853 
better understanding of epidemiological data. Integrating these disciplines in research is 854 
challenging, but these are important epistemological considerations that extend well beyond 855 
the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa. Critically, understanding this heterogeneity will enable 856 
nuanced responses to outbreaks likely to be more effective and better received by the 857 
population.  858 
 859 
Indeed, given current debates around evidence in the COVID-19 pandemic, we offer 860 
important reflections on how, in collaborations between epidemiologists and social sciences, 861 
the complementarity in collection, interpretation and use of qualitative and quantitative data, 862 
can produce not only more context-appropriate responses but also more accurate efforts to 863 
explain and model an epidemic taking into account social dynamics. Our findings raise 864 
questions about what evidence and whose knowledge “counts” ([14], [15]). A key implication 865 
of our analysis is the necessity for local knowledge and inputs to be incorporated in the 866 
planning of any future outbreak responses – including in the current Covid-19 outbreak. This 867 
would involve working closely with key local figures coming from, or based in, the study 868 
communities in order to obtain a full picture of what has happened, why, and how outbreak 869 
responses can be made more compatible with local realities. It is also important that local 870 
nuance informs subnational and national response planning, with local data aggregated at 871 
subnational level to identify geographical patterns of disease. Of immediate relevance, in 872 
terms of future preparedness and current Covid-19 response, is the training of local 873 
researchers, with detailed knowledge of local cultural contexts, in ethnographic field 874 
methods, to join teams carrying out real-time epidemiological analysis and help re-frame 875 
research as part of crisis response efforts.  876 
 877 
 878 
 879 
 880 
 25 
 881 
Acknowledgements 882 
 883 
Tommy M. Hanson is thanked for helping to carry out interviews in Bumpeh Ngao chiefdom 884 
in 2017. Foday Mamoud Kamara and Esther Yei Mokuwa are thanked for helping to carry 885 
out interviews in Niawa Lenga chiefdom in 2018. Dina Balabanova, Melissa Parker and two 886 
referees for the journal are thanked for their helpful comments on the manuscript.  887 
 888 
Members of the Ebola Gbalo research team are Lawrence S Babawo, Dina Balabanova, 889 
Johanna Hanefeld, Tommy M Hanson, Baigeh Johnson, Foday Mahmoud Kamara, Bashiru 890 
Koroma, Susannah H Mayhew (PI), Alfred Mokuwa, Esther Yei-Mokuwa, Melissa Parker, 891 
Paul Richards, Ahmed Vandi. 892 
 893 
  894 
 26 
References 895 
 896 
[1] Garske T, Cori A, Ariyarajah A, Blake I, Dorigatti I, Eckmanns T, Fraser C, Hinsley W, 897 
Jombart T, Mills H, Nedjati-Gilani G, Newton E, Nouvellet P, Perkins D, Riley S, 898 
Schumacher D, Shah A, Van Kerkhove M, Dye C, Donnelly C, Heterogeneities in the case 899 
fatality ratio in the West African Ebola outbreak 2013–2016. Philosophical Transactions of 900 
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 2016, 372. 20160308. 10.1098/rstb.2016.0308. 901 
 902 
[2] Ebola Gbalo Research Team, Responding to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in DR 903 
Congo: when will we learn from Sierra Leone? The Lancet, 2019, 393, Issue 10191, 2647 – 904 
2650 905 
 906 
[3] Li-Qun Fang, Yang Yang, Jia-Fu Jiang, Hong-Wu Yao, David Kargbo, Xin-Lou Li, Bao-907 
Gui Jiang, Brima Kargbo, Yi-Gang Tong, Ya-Wei Wang, Kun Liu, Abdul Kamara, Foday 908 
Dafae, Alex Kanu, Rui-Ruo Jiang, Ye Sun, Ruo-Xi Sun, Wan-Jun Chen, Mai-Juan 909 
Ma, Natalie E. Dean, Harold Thomas, Ira M. Longini Jr., M. Elizabeth Halloran, and Wu-910 
Chun Cao (2016) Transmission dynamics of Ebola virus disease and intervention 911 
effectiveness in Sierra Leone, PNAS April 19, 2016 113 (16) 4488-912 
4493; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1518587113 913 
 914 
[4] International Ebola Response Team, Agua-Agum J, Ariyarajah A, Aylward B, Bawo L, 915 
Bilivogui P, et al., Exposure Patterns Driving Ebola Transmission in West Africa: A 916 
Retrospective Observational Study. PLoS Med 2016, 13(11): e1002170. 917 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002170 918 
 919 
[5] Wong J Y, Zhang W, Kargbo D, Haque U, Hu W, Wu P, … Liu C, Assessment of the 920 
severity of Ebola virus disease in Sierra Leone in 2014-2015. Epidemiology and 921 
infection, 2016, 144(7), 1473–1481. doi:10.1017/S0950268815003003 922 
 923 
[6] Krauer F, Gsteiger S, Low N, Hansen CH, Althaus CL (2016) Heterogeneity in District-924 
Level Transmission of Ebola Virus Disease during the 2013-2015 epidemic in West Africa. 925 
PLoS Negl Trop Dis 10(7): e0004867. doi:10.1371/journal. pntd.0004867 926 
 927 
[7] Richards P, Ebola: how a people’s science helped end an epidemic, London: Zed Books, 928 
2016. 929 
 930 
[8] Richards P, Amara J, Ferme MC, Kamara P, Mokuwa E, Sheriff AI, et al., Social 931 
Pathways for Ebola Virus Disease in Rural Sierra Leone, and Some Implications for 932 
Containment. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2015, 9(4): e0003567. doi:10.1371/ journal.pntd.0003567 933 
 934 
[9] Parker M, Hanson TM, Vandi A, Babawo LS, & Allen T, Ebola and Public Authority: 935 
Saving Loved Ones in Sierra Leone, Medical Anthropology, 2019, 38:5, 440-936 
454, DOI: 10.1080/01459740.2019.1609472 937 
 938 
[10] Manguvo A & Mafuvadze B, The impact of traditional and religious practices on the 939 
spread of Ebola in West Africa: time for a strategic shift. The Pan African Medical 940 
Journal, 22 Suppl 1(Suppl 1), 2015, 9. doi:10.11694/pamj.supp.2015.22.1.6190 941 
 942 
[11] Ferguson N, Capturing human behaviour. Nature 2007, 446, 733, doi:10.1038/446733a 943 
 944 
[12] Mokuwa EY, Maat H, Rural populations exposed to Ebola Virus Disease respond 945 
positively to localised case handling: Evidence from Sierra Leone. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2020,  946 
14(1): e0007666. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0007666 947 
 948 
 27 
[13] Richards P, Mokuwa E, Welmers P, Maat H, Beisel U, Trust, and distrust, of Ebola 949 
Treatment Centers: A case-study from Sierra Leone. PLoS ONE 2019, 14(12): e0224511. 950 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224511  951 
 952 
[14] DiGiacomo SM, Can there be a “cultural epidemiology”? Medical Anthropology 953 
Quarterly, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1525/maq.1999.13.4.436 954 
 955 
[15] Nichter M, Global health: why cultural perceptions, social representations, and 956 
biopolitics matter, Tucson AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2008 957 
 958 
 959 
 960 
 961 
 962 
 963 
 964 
 965 
 966 
  967 
 28 
Table 1: Ebola in Sierra Leone by District, date of first case, average length of infection chains at chiefdom level, and 968 
total numbers of laboratory confirmed cases 969 
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 998 
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 1000 
  1001 
DISTRICT 
DATE OF FIRST 
CASE 
LENGTH OF 
INFECTION 
(days) N OF CASES  
 onset of symptoms lab confirmed 
BO 13/06/2014 90 315  
BONTHE 10/10/2014 32 6  
BOMBALI 06/07/2014 161 1049  
KAILAHUN 18/05/2014 133 524  
KAMBIA 12/09/2014 259 241  
KENEMA 13/06/2014 120 497  
KOINADUGU 29/08/2014 198 111  
KONO 27/06/2014 132 260  
MOYAMBA 02/07/2014 95 211  
PORT LOKO 02/07/2014 280 1202  
PUJEHUN 28/07/2014 67 31  
TONKOLILI 05/08/2014 151 489  
Western Rural 20/07/2015 300 1146  
Western Urban 25/06/2015 406 2274  
ALL PROVINCIAL  4936 59% 
ALL WESTERN AREA  3420 41% 
TOTAL   8356 % 
      
      
      
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 29 
 1002 
 1003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
